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Abstract—Physical unclonable functions (PUF) extract secrets
from randomness inherent in manufacturing processes. PUFs
are utilized for basic cryptographic tasks such as authentication
and key generation, and more recently, to realize key exchange
and bit commitment requiring a large number of error free
responses from a strong PUF. We propose an approach to elim-
inate the need to implement expensive on-chip error correction
logic implementation and the associated helper data storage
to reconcile naturally noisy PUF responses. In particular, we
exploit a statistical model of an Arbiter PUF (APUF) constructed
under the nominal operating condition during the challenge
response enrollment phase by a trusted party to judiciously select
challenges that yield error-free responses even across a wide op-
erating conditions, specifically, a ±20% supply voltage variation
and a 40◦C temperature variation. We validate our approach
using measurements from two APUF datasets. Experimental
results indicate that large number of error-free responses can
be generated on demand under worst-case when PUF response
error rate is up to 16.68%.
Index Terms—Error free response, PUF, Modeling building
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are low-cost hardware
security primitives and can be seamlessly integrated with
devices during the design and fabrication processes [1], [2],
[3], to act as trust anchors. The PUF, in essence, extracts
secrets from the inevitable process variations. Hence, in reality,
identical PUF instances cannot be forged, not even by the same
manufacturer. There exists a number of PUF structures [4],
[5], [6], [7]. Among them, time-delay based PUFs [5], [1],
in particular, the Arbiter PUF (APUF) and its variants such
as XOR-APUFs, is one of popular silicon PUF construction
considering its compact structure and the large challenge-
response pair (CRP) space characterizing of a strong PUF [8].
Prominent PUF applications include authentication and
cryptographic key generation [1]. In recent years, use of
PUFs in more advanced cryptographic protocols such as key
exchange, oblivious transfer, bit commitment and muti-party
computation [9], [10], where a strong PUF is always required,
has been investigated. Although authentication is able to
tolerate the noisy PUF responses, key generation applications
and key exchange, especially recent advanced cryptographic
protocols [9], require large number of error free responses.
Stabilizing PUF response is usually left to the on-chip error
correcting logic assisted by the associated priori computed
helper data as illustrated in Fig. 1. Such a scheme maybe
adequate for a single or a small number of key extractions
such as from SRAM PUFs [7], but becomes a limitation when
a large number of keys are necessary. We propose exploiting
PUF models, originally used attack PUFs by creating PUF
functional copies [8], to enable the determination of a ran-
domly selected challenge to generate error-free response under
all operating conditions in the absence of the APUF. The
developed approach is able to: i) eschew expensive error cor-
rection logic on PUF embedded security modules; ii) overcome
the burden of exhaustive characterization of huge number of
CRPs, especially when large number of keys extracted from
strong PUFs are necessary; iii) eliminate computation of helper
data and subsequent on-chip storage or off-chip storage and
transfer. We summarize our contributions below:
a) We exploit statistical delay models of APUFs to evaluate
the response reliability of a random challenge to select
challenges that generate error-free responses under all
operating conditions.
b) We have validated our approach based on two APUF
datasets. First, we build synthetic APUFs using real-world
RO-PUF [6] frequency measurements to acquire arbitrary
number of CRPs for performing extensive evaluations.
Second, we use 64,000 CRPs collected across eight
APUFs implemented on eight FPGAs. Our results show
that no erroneous bits occur when selected responses are
re-evaluated across a wide range of operating conditions.
In addition, the selected challenges still exhibit the ran-
domness characteristic expected from the corresponding
responses.
c) We show that our error-free response generation method
is ’cost-free’ to the PUF integrated device without any
area or power overhead. Building a model takes less
than fifteen seconds including collecting a small number,
10,000, of CRPs and the subsequent delay-time statistical
characterization of each delay segment at each stage of
an APUF, while the reliable challenge selection using the
Fig. 1. Generalized ECC based PUF key generation scheme.
model can be performed on demand.
Next section introduces related work. Section III describes
the approach to build an accurate statistical delay model
of an APUF, and subsequently describes an algorithm to
filter challenges that produce highly reliable response bits.
Section IV validates the proposed approach based on two
APUF datasets. Section V concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Reconciling PUF response errors is usually carried out by
employing error correction codes (ECC). Thus the ECC based
generalized PUF key generations have two phases as illustrated
in Fig. 1: (1) The key enrollment phase computes helper data
that will be used in (2) the key regeneration phase to reconcile
errors of the reproduced response and retrieve the enrolled key.
This scheme is efficient to guarantee a small number of
error-free responses to derive a single cryptographic key
such as from a SRAM PUF [7], but it becomes expensive
when multiple number of keys are necessary to realize: i)
revocation of keys; ii) session key exchange; iii) controlled
PUF constructions [4], [11]. These applications all prefer
employing a strong PUF that is able to provide a large number
of error-free responses. Notably, the associated helper data
leaks information that may be exploited to attack PUFs [12].
There is a concurrent but independent investigation of
selecting reliable responses of delay-based PUFs [13] using
simulated data, where the effect of explicit PUF operational
conditions, such as operating voltage and temperature, on
the selection strategy remains to be investigated. Based on
measured data, we extensively evaluate our error-free response
generation approach across a wide range of operating condi-
tions.
III. ERROR FREE RESPONSE SELECTION
We assume that a trusted party—the server—has one-time
access to the underlying APUFs acting as a PUF building
block within the controlled PUF or PUF embedded crypto-
graphic key generators. The PUF building block can also be
XOR-APUFs rather than basic APUFs. The server securely
stores the derived statistical model of each APUF and destroys
the one-time access, eg., fusing one-time programmable wires.
The challenge response interface can be protected. For exam-
ple, in a controlled PUF construction, it is achieved in a way
of g(x) = h2(h1(x), f(h1(x))), where h is a hash function,
x is the input, and f(·) is the PUF.
We employ a delay time adaptive characterization technique
following [14] to build up a statistical model of an APUF
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Fig. 2. Structure of an arbiter PUF (APUF). Signal propagation delays of
the top path ttop and the bottom path tbottom in the arbiter input determines
the response bits.
that is able to accurately estimate the internal delay times
of the APUF to eschew physically characterizations. In [14],
the authors employ this adaptive characterization to realize an
impersonation of an APUF from a physical means rather than
a software means. During the key extraction phase, filtered
reliable challenges are issued by the server and applied to
the PUF to obtain reliable response bits that can be directly
utilized to derive keys without error correction. Next, we detail
the principles of generating error free responses when wire
delay times for all stages of the APUF are estimated.
A. Arbiter PUF
As depicted in Fig. 2, an APUF consists of k stages
of two 2-input multiplexers, or any other unit forming two
theoretically symmetrical, but practically asymmetrical, signal
paths due to inherent randomness in the fabrication processes.
To generate a response bit, an active pulse is fed as an input
to the first stage, while the selection bit of ci, i ∈ {1, ..., k}
determines the signal path to the next stage. For example, if
ci = 1, two signals propagate from 1 to 3 and from 2 to 4,
respectively, in other words, these two signals pass through the
i-th stage of the APUF without crossing. Conversely, if ci = 0,
they propagate from 1 to 4 and from 2 to 3 concurrently, these
two paths are referred to as cross paths. We refer to the delay
time from 1 to 3 of ith stage as ti13, and the corresponding
delays through the others as ti14, ti23, and ti24. At the circuit
level, each stage of the APUF can be implemented by a
multiplexer. At the end of the cascaded multiplexers, an arbiter,
which can be implemented by a latch, determines whether the
top or bottom signal arrives first and hence results in a logic
‘0’ or ‘1’, accordingly, to yield a 1-bit response.
B. Response Reliability
More specifically, the delay time difference tdif between the
delay time of the top path ttop and the delay time of the bottom
path tbottom determines the response bit (output) at the arbiter
and also its reliability, as depicted in Fig. 3. For a randomly
chosen challenge, if the corresponding delay time difference
tdif > 0, then a response of ‘0’ is produced, and vice versa.
Further, if |tdif | ≤ |∆t|, ∆t being a delay discrimination
threshold, the delay time difference tdif falls into the unreliable
region as illustrated in Fig. 3; then the corresponding response
bit has a high probability of being nondeterministic during
repeated regeneration attempts, especially under varying en-
vironmental conditions. Conversely, if |tdif | > |∆t| , then a
highly reliable response bit can be expected. Further, if |∆t| is
far away from zero, we can expect that a response bit without
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Fig. 3. (a) Delay time difference tdif distribution, where tdif = ttop −
tbottom , ttop and tbottom are the signal propagation delay times of the
input signal at the top path and the bottom path respectively. (b) Response
bit reliability determined by tdif to a given challenge.
error will be generated. This relies on the fact that responses to
those challenges resulting in a large |tdif | are able to tolerate
a greater degree of environmental variations, eg., fluctuation
of supply voltage, and temperature, as further depicted in
Fig. 4. For example, considering that the ttop and tbottom
have different simplified linear temperature co-efficients. A
large tdif guarantees no intersection between ttop and tbottom,
while an intersection eventually results in a flipped response—
erroneous response when the temperature deviates. Similar
observation has shown in [1], where a pair of ring oscillators
(ROs) exhibiting a large frequency difference ensures a reliable
response bits regenerated from a ROPUF.
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Fig. 4. Delay time as a function of the temperature. (a) Challenge always
reproduces the response with 100% reliability within the temperature range
from Tmin to Tmax. (b) Challenge results in an unreliable response bit.
If ti13, ti14, ti23, and ti24 can be accurately measured, then it
is easy to determine challenges capable of generating highly
reliable response bits by evaluating |tdif |. Concurrently, the
response bit value, being ‘0’ or ‘1’, can also be judiciously
determined. Physical measurement of each delay segment is
hard, if not impossible, in practice. It may require probing
the die which may damage the circuit or alter the delay, or
other on-chip complicated peripheral circuits that are always
unavailable for resource-constraint devices [15]. Next, we
introduce a method following [14] for obtaining a statistical
model to capture delay times of internal wires for all k stages
of an APUF.
C. Modeling an APUF
The goal of a statistical model is to accurately characterize
individual delay times of ti13, ti14, ti23, and ti24. More specif-
ically, if the probability of ti13 > ti24, P (ti13 > ti24), and
probability of ti14 > ti23, P (ti14 > ti23), can be estimated
precisely, then P (ti13 > ti24) and P (ti14 > ti23) can be used to
replace the delay time difference of ti13−ti24 and ti14−ti23 at the
i-th stage of an APUF. In other words, we need to statistically
estimate the following four probabilities in (1) after collecting
a number of CRPs.
P i13 = P (t
i
13 is longer than ti24 at i-th stage)
P i24 = P (t
i
24 is longer than ti13 at i-th stage)
P i14 = P (t
i
14 is longer than ti23 at i-th stage)
P i23 = P (t
i
23 is longer than ti14 at i-th stage)
(1)
Given the probabilistic formula of delays, there exists two
relations P i13+P i24 = 1 and P i14+P i23 = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}.
The P i13, P i24, P i14, P i23 for all stages are estimated based on
an adaptive characterization technique. We refer readers to Xu
et .al’s work for detailed implementations [14]. Consequently,
a statistical delay model of an APUF is obtained when P i13,
P i24, P
i
14, P
i
23 for all stages are estimated. As there is a linear
relation between the delay time, eg., t12, and its corresponding
probability, eg., P12 [14], we can use the corresponding
probability to replace the delay time and consequently to
predict responses and concurrently their reliability for unseen
challenges according to tdif that is the summation of delay
difference for all stages.
D. Determining Reliable Challenges
Filtering reliable response bits is straightforward and simple,
once the statistical model is obtained, and it is a one-time task
done during the enrollment phase by the server—the trusted
authority. Most importantly, it costs no extra area and power
overhead to the PUF integrated device, while it also avoids the
overhead related to the ECC and helper data during both, key
enrollment and regeneration phases. The challenge filtering
procedure is described in the Algorithm. 1.
Algorithm 1 Filtering challenges that generate reliable re-
sponses based on the statistical models of APUFs
1: procedure selection (a randomly chosen challenge C, PUF
model f(·), ∆t)
2: tdif ← f(C)
3: if tdif < −∆t then
4: response ← 0; select C;
5: return
6: else if tdif > ∆t then
7: response ← 1; select C;
8: return
9: else
10: discard C;
11: return
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATIONS
In this section, we empirically evaluate the reliable chal-
lenge selection method employing two datasets: i) we build
up synthetic APUFs using ROPUFs [16] frequency measure-
ments, by this means, we are able to obtain almost arbitrary
number of CRPs for extensively testings; ii) we use the CRP
data collected across eight APUFs implemented on eight FP-
GAs [17], the total number of CRPs in this dataset is 64,000,
which is the main reason that we consider the synthesized
APUFs first to obtain arbitrary number of CRPs due to 64,000
CRPs insufficient for some tests. For example, by using the
first dataset, we test up to 50 million reliable challenges, all
yielding error free responses, filtered from 830 million random
challenges. This large number empirical tests is hard to be
carried out based on the second dataset.
Building a statistical model of an APUF only requires
collecting a number, 10,000, of CRPs under the nominal
condition rather than all operating conditions. Time of CRP
collection costs less than one second considering that one CRP
evaluation needs 50 ns for a 64-stage APUF [5]. The delay
characterization takes only less than fifteen seconds to obtain
a model, where we use MATLAB 2012b to achieve the model
building and the processor is an Intel i7-3770CPU@3.4GHz
CPU.
A. Dataset Descriptions
There are five ROPUFs implemented across five Spartan3E
S500 FPGAs boards in Virginia Tech’s public ROPUF data.
Each FPGA implements one ROPUF that consists of 512
ring oscillators (ROs). Detailed implementation information
is detailed in [18]. The dataset contains each RO’s frequency
measurements. Each RO’s frequency is measured 100 times
under 0.96 V, 1.08 V, 1.20 V, 1.32 V, 1.44 V, respectively, at a
fixed temperature of 25◦C to reflect supply voltage influence.
Similarly, each RO is also evaluated 100 times under 35◦C,
45◦C, 55◦C, 65◦C, respectively, with a fixed supply voltage of
1.20 V, to reflect influence from temperature changes. To use
these measurements for synthesizing an APUF, we employ the
inverse of frequencies of four ROs to replace ti13, ti24, ti14, ti23 in
order to form the realistic delay time behavior of the i-th stage
in the APUF. By this means, we are able to exploit existing
real time delay data to form a 64-stage synthesized APUF by
using 256 ROs implemented in the same FPGA board. The
arbiter (performing delay time comparison) function is carried
out off-chip by post-processing in MATLAB. Consequently,
we obtain five synthesized APUFs.
The second CRP dataset are obtained from eight PDL
(programmable delay line) APUFs; each has 128 stages. Each
APUF is fed with 64000 challenges, therefore, 64000 CRPs
are collected [19], [20]. For each CRP, it is evaluated 128
times the same operating condition. In total, nine operating
conditions are considered: (5◦C, 0.95 V); (5◦C, 1.00 V); (5◦C,
1.05 V); (35◦C, 0.95 V); (35◦C, 1.00 V); (35◦C, 1.05 V);
(65◦C, 0.95 V); (65◦C, 1.05 V); (65◦C, 1.05 V). We treat
(35◦C, 1.00 V) as the nominal condition.
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Fig. 5. Bit error rate (BER) under different supply voltage and temperature
settings. Results are in well agreement with other experimentally reported
results [21], [22].
B. Results of Synthesized APUFs
We evaluate each APUF’s bit error rate (BER). The BER
is the probability that two PUF responses from two distinct
and random evaluations subject to the same randomly chosen
challenge applied to the same PUF are different. In practice,
a reference response took under the nominal condition is
always used, while the regenerated response took under a
different operating condition is compared with the reference
response [21]. In our tests, each response bit is evaluated
100 times given the same challenge under the same operating
condition. Results are shown in Fig. 5. The BER solely
introduced by noise is around 2.2% when both voltage and
temperature are under the nominal condition, where the volt-
age is 1.2 V and the temperature is 25◦C. We can see that
supply voltage has predominant influence on the APUF BER
compared with the temperature. Further, the worst-case BER
of 12.98% is observed when the voltage has a −20% deviation
from the nominal condition. Although APUFs evaluated here
are synthesized, the presented reliability performance is in
good agreement with [21], [22].
In the following descriptions, for convenience, we refer to
a challenge that satisfies |tdif | > ∆t as a reliable challenge.
Concurrently, we refer to the response bit corresponding to a
reliable challenge as a reliable response. The statistical model
has 97% response accuracy prediction that is well agreed
with [14]. After reliable challenges are selected by performing
the challenge filtering Algorithm 1, they are applied to the
same APUF when operating conditions are changed to any
setting within a wide range. The regenerated response bits
are compared with the reference response bit evaluated at
the nominal condition. If they are same, this indicates that
such a filtered challenge does have a very high tolerance to
the environmental changes, which guarantees an error free
response bit regenerated across a wide operating conditions.
Otherwise, an error is marked and counted. We calculate the
error rate that is the percentage of counted errors out of the
number of selected reliable challenges. It is convenient to refer
the error rate under a specific ∆t setting as BER@∆t. We
denote the BER@∆t as below.
BER@∆t. The BER@∆t is the probability that the reeval-
uated response bit took under one random chosen operating
condition within a range is different from the reference re-
TABLE I
BER@∆t. SYNTHETIC APUF OPERATIONAL RANGE: SUPPLY
VOLTAGE(1.08-1.32 V), TEMPERATURE(25◦C-65◦C)
APUF
No
BER@
Default
BER@
(∆t
= 0.5)
BER@
(∆t
= 0.75)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.0)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.25)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.5)
1 6.30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2 6.43% 0.013% 0% 0% 0% 0%
3 6.21% 0.00205% 0% 0% 0% 0%
4 6.34% 0.007% 0% 0% 0% 0%
5 6.60% 0.01% 0.0008% 0% 0% 0%
TABLE II
BER@∆t. SYNTHETIC APUF OPERATIONAL RANGE: SUPPLY
VOLTAGE(0.96-1.44 V), TEMPERATURE(25◦C-65◦C)
APUF
No
BER@
Default
BER@
(∆t
= 0.5)
BER@
(∆t
= 0.75)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.0)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.25)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.5)
1 11.68% 0.91% 0.1338% 0.0041% 0% 0%
2 11.90% 0.18% 0.13% 0.0056% 0.0006% 0%
3 11.92% 1.44% 0.22% 0.0023% 0.001% 0%
4 12.97% 1.29% 0.18% 0.0115% 0% 0%
5 12.98% 1.76% 0.34% 0.05% 0.0008% 0%
sponse bit evaluated under the nominal operating condition
by applying the same selected reliable challenge to the same
PUF, where the reliable challenge resulted delay time differ-
ence between top and bottom paths in an APUF satisfying
|tdif | > ∆t.
We also refer BER@(∆t = 0) as BER@Default. In fact,
BER@Default is the BER when challenge filtering is not
employed, eg., shown in Fig. 5.
1) Reliability of Filtered Responses: Tested results are
shown in Table. I and II. The BER@∆t is evaluated within
different operating ranges for each Table. Noting the supply
voltage range of Table. II (±20% deviation) is larger than
Table. I (±10% deviation). It is not surprising that BER@∆t is
not zero when the ∆t is set to a small value. But as the ∆t goes
up, BER@∆t decreases significantly. When the ∆t = 1.5, all
filtered challenges that satisfy |tdif | > (∆t = 1.5) produce
responses with 100% reliability. The APUF5 is the most
interested testing sample because, in Fig. 5, APUF5 has the
highest worst-case BER of 12.98% among other APUFs when
the voltage varies between 0.96 V and 1.44 V. By using
judiciously selected error free responses to derive keys, it
equals to an ECC decoder that has to correct at least 12.98%
errors.
Due to infinite number of reliable challenges filtering cannot
be achieved in evaluation, we use up to more than 830 million
randomly generated challenges for all testings, among them,
50 million selected reliable challenges are obtained when the
∆t = 1.5. We can see that all of responses given selected
challenges are error free regenerated even when the supply
voltage has a ±20% variation and the temperature experiences
a 40◦C variation.
2) CRP Loss: The CRP loss is the probability that a
randomly given challenge cannot meet the challenge filtering
criterion of |tdif | > ∆t. The CRP loss is increasing as the
∆t increases. Fig. 6 depicts the CRP loss as a function of
∆t. We can see that 94% response bits will be discarded
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Fig. 6. Illustration of CRP loss induced by the reliable challenge filtering.
TABLE III
BER@∆t. PDL APUF OPERATIONAL RANGE: SUPPLY
VOLTAGE(0.95-1.05 V), TEMPERATURE(5◦C-65◦C)
APUF
No
BER@
Default
BER@
(∆t
= 0.5)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.0)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.5)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.6)
BER@
(∆t
= 1.7)
1 10.57% 1.26% 0.095% 0% 0% 0%
2 16.68% 8.05% 1.46% 0.039% 0% 0%
3 8.59% 1.08% 0.037% 0% 0% 0%
4 8.62% 0.656% 0.013% 0% 0% 0%
5 11.52% 0.08% 0% 0% 0% 0%
6 11.07% 0.71% 0.031% 0% 0% 0%
7 5.87% 1.35% 0.032% 0% 0% 0%
8 15.00% 5.98% 0.89% 0.056% 0.085% 0%
when |tdif | > (∆t = 1.5). As an APUF is able to generate
an exponential number of CRPs as a function of the number
of stages k, large number of reliable challenges can still be
promised. For example, given a 64-stage APUF, its CRP space
is up to 264. Hence, there are still 264 × 0.06 > 259 error
free response bits available. When the PUF operating range
varies insignificant in practice, a smaller ∆t can be chosen to
decrease the CRP loss while still produce error free responses
as shown in Table. I.
C. PDL APUFs
The statistical model is obtained by training 10,000 CRPs
evaluated only under the nominal condition and the prediction
accuracy with 92.41% is achieved. This lower prediction ac-
curacy compared with the prediction accuracy of the synthetic
APUF model are attributed to [9]: i) The slightly increased
nominal BER is 4.99% that is obtained under the nominal
condition—the nominal BER of the synthesized APUF is
2.2%, see Fig. 5; ii) The usage of PDLs on FPGA, which
makes the MUX structure more complicated (slightly nonlin-
earity is introduced).
There are eight PDL APUFs tested, each of them is imple-
mented on a different FPGA board. The maximum BER@∆t
for all of eight APUFs are listed in Table. III. Among
tested eight APUFs, the maximum worst-case BER@Default
is 16.68%. When the ∆t = 1.7, there is no error found in all
reproduced responses under any tested operating condition.
Same to the results obtained from synthesized APUFs in II,
BER@∆t decreases as the ∆t increases. There are still around
1% challenges satisfying the selection criterion for all eight
tested APUFs even when ∆t = 1.7.
We further investigate the response randomness—
percentage of occurrence of ‘1’s in response bits—relationship
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Fig. 7. Randomness under different ∆t settings.
with the ∆t, In general, the challenge filtering should not
result into a bias to PUF’s response with a preferable
value (‘0’/‘1’). In Fig. 7, the challenge filtering does not
deteriorate the randomness of the selected reliable response
bits. The randomness is always close to 50% when the
challenge filtering is performed under different ∆t settings.
In addition, even the response’s randomness is not close to
50% initially, the challenge filtering seems eliminate such an
initial randomness bias.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose an approach for determining error free re-
sponses even when they are re-evaluated across a wide range
of operating condition. The proposed approach can be adopted
into controlled PUF designs and also provide large number of
error free responses on demand for advanced cryptographic
applications. This method has no burden to the PUF embedded
devices because there is no ECC and helper data involved,
where the model building is left to the server and only asks
negligible computational resources to the server. Extensive
empirically evaluations validate the practicability of our error
free response methodology. There are some interesting future
works. Firstly, though good results have been demonstrated
through simulated data [13] considering aging effects, further
empirical validations remain to be investigated. Secondly,
adopting our error-free response generation method in to
controlled PUFs [11]. In this context, it is imperative to
reduce the CRP loss, which will enable an efficient control
logic realization within the controlled PUFs. Last but not
least, attacks assisted by the helper data compromising the
security of a key generator only extracting a single key or
very limited number of keys [12] may be even harder, if
not impossible, when they are mounted to key generators in
capable of generating a large number of keys where the helper
data is not used. This will be another interesting investigation
of securely using error-free responses [23].
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